The 'last 10 percent' and the growing cost of American military power around the world

The next ten percent of military destruction now costs more than the first ninety, and that is the lesson of the past four years and the main problem facing modern military strategy.

The wars in Ukraine and Iran are examples of a past era of violent, devastating conflicts in the case of Russia and Ukraine, as well as a repeat of the conflicts that will define the 21st century. Unmanned systems, data science at the scale of enabling information processing and targeting, distributed command and control, and cheap precision strike have tangible effects on the battlefield that show an uncertain future, and cheap lethal effects and available software present a real opportunity for the democratization of organized violence that includes the expectations that countries can carry when they choose to take the country to war.

The Russian-Ukrainian war, more than four years in the making, is the deadliest European war since 1945, with Russian casualties over a million killed and wounded and Ukrainian casualties running at 250,000 to 300,000 by the same count. Europe will never be the same after this war, but a long-term change has taken place in a stable battlefield when measured by the front lines separating Russian and Ukrainian forces. Russia controls about twenty percent of Ukraine, an area about the size of Pennsylvania, and in the past twelve months has gained a total of 1,669 square kilometers, about 0.7 percent of Ukraine's territory. Given the level of human losses, it would be perfectly reasonable to expect a much greater exchange of space, and instead the line of communication has been almost frozen for more than two years as the violence continues at an unprecedented speed.

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Iran's wars have shown similar potential in a compressed timeline, twice. In June 2025 the United States executed Operation Midnight Hammer, hitting Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan with GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators and nearly a dozen Tomahawk cruise missiles in twenty-five minutes, after which the Twelve Day War ended within forty-eight hours. Eight months later, the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury, almost 900 strikes in twelve hours killed the supreme leader Ali Khamenei and determined the leadership of the regime's military, while Iran responded with hundreds of ballistic missiles and thousands of drones attacking one way across the region. By April 1 the UAE alone had used 438 missiles, 2,012 drones, and 19 cruise missiles launched from Iran, and American losses were 13 killed and 381 wounded before the April 8 ceasefire, with Operation Project Freedom and the May 7 engagement near the Strait of Hormuz. The political and economic situation in the Middle East is in turmoil, but it is surprising that this has happened without the military activities one would expect to accompany such major shifts.

Although the United States has achieved significant destruction of Iran's military infrastructure in both of these operations, any further escalation will require the adoption of a new phase of Iran's response, and the Trump administration's reasonable hesitation in such a choice is a tacit acknowledgment that the next ten percent of the destruction of Iran's military will come at a heavier rate than the previous ninety percent. A new paradigm for the Middle East is here, and it comes amid a strange situation even though the usual metrics of war damage assessment during the war paint a clear picture of American supremacy.

This is the Last Ten Percent, the structural condition under which the regular military now operates, where the destruction of fixed infrastructure remains well within American means while the coercion of a determined enemy to a defined political outcome does not, and the cost curve has inverted.

The new air battle arithmetic shows the transformation. Iran's Shahed-136 costs about twenty thousand to fifty thousand dollars per unit, while a single Patriot PAC-3 interceptor costs more than four million, THAAD interceptors run about fifteen million each, and a single Patriot battery costs about $1.5 billion. The cost of the CENTCOM interceptor against the Shahed alone exceeded three billion dollars in the first six months of the Iran conflict, and although the levels of strategic interception are close to ninety percent, the average cost of the campaign still favors the attacker because each Shahed that forces the launch of the Patriot fulfills its strategic objective even when it is destroyed fifteen kilometers from its target.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR ENTERS FIFTH YEAR AS EXPERTS EXPLAIN 3 POSSIBLE OUTCOMES.

Ukraine pointed out that Magura V5 seaplanes costing about $250,000 to $300,000 each forced the withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk and damaged or sank about a third of those ships, so that non-belligerent forces gained control of the Black Sea for a fraction of the Black Sea. of the amount removed.

If a world hegemon, in partnership with one of the most capable militaries in the world, can pursue war to achieve political ends with such uncertain results, then it is reasonable to wonder if war will remain the same type of political option that existed thousands of years ago. Low-level soldiers are clearly able to wield significant military power in a way that was not possible before the digital age, and the question for military forces in general is whether traditional ideas of victory remain worth their dramatically increased costs.

The management has already named the problem. The National Security Strategy of November 2025 acknowledges that “the huge gap, shown in recent conflicts, between inexpensive drones and missiles compared to the expensive systems needed to defend against them highlights our need to change and adapt,” and that “America needs a national push to develop a powerful defense at a low cost.” This same document establishes the Predisposition to Non-Interventionism as a fundamental principle of American strategy and organizes its Middle East phase in terms of responsibility to shift burdens and avoid permanent wars. The diagnosis is true and the theory is correct, although the political killings have now twice failed to honor both, since Midnight Hammer happened before the NSS blocked and Epic Fury happened after.

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What the United States is saying is restraint coupled with reinvestment. Self-restraint is necessary because the Final Ten Percent makes the Middle East unreasonably stuck no matter how satisfied the first nineties may feel, and the Iranian regime, as it has been degraded throughout Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury, presents a situation in which the United States must combine operational advantages, a Strategy to return home and protect National Security. Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere, and block China in the Indo-Pacific.

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The reinvestment is necessary because the cost curve has changed while the portfolio of American acquisitions has not changed, and although the opposition in this argument correctly notes that drones do not hold, that the case of American artificial intelligence is broader than independent guidance, and that deterrence will continue to require both the weight involved and the best plans, those points should strengthen the end of the portfolio.

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The Department of War still buys good platforms at a good cost, and that is necessary, but it does not buy a quantity that is not accessible to scale, it does not buy gun-based and guided systems involving Shahds for hundreds of dollars per gun rather than millions, and it does not buy interceptor drones for two to five thousand dollars that the Ukrainian manufacturer has shown to have a price of two thousand dollars. The NSS needs national mobilization to close this gap, although it remains to be seen whether that call survives the interaction with the existing defense-industrial situation, and the American situation in the Indo-Pacific, where the ideal enemy includes the largest military force in the world and the deepest arsenal of missiles in the world, depends on the answer.

The world that reflects this thesis will not be a Pollyannaish manifestation of the end of history in the style of Fukuyama, and instability may increase while many people may die, as the future of the forces tortured on the battlefield is uncertain especially when some of those forces will be built, and goals, robots.